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1. Introduction
 Motivation
 Smartphones get increasingly popular
 Moore‘s law constantly leads to „stronger“ 
devices
 Device got attractive to malware writers
 Smartphones faced wide range of malware 
attacks
 Most work end 2006
 Continuous information needed for researchers
 Public data inconsistent 
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2. Background
 Malicious Software (Malware)
 Software with malicious intentions
 Major categories:
 Virus: Hosting file can be virus itself, mostly needs 
user interaction for propagation
 Worm: malicious code does not necessarily need 
a hosting file, normally, no user interaction
needed for propagation
 Trojan horse: disguises malicious intention, 
user interaction normally needed for propagation 
(user install)
14.09.2009 SIDAR Spring 2009 - Stuttgart Folie 6
Agenda
1. Introduction
2. Background
3. Smartphone Malware Statistics
4. Countermeasures
5. Conclusion
14.09.2009 SIDAR Spring 2009 - Stuttgart Folie 7
3. Smartphone Malware Statistics
Smartphone Malware Appearance
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3. Smartphone Malware Statistics 
Smartphone Malware Effects
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3. Smartphone Malware Statistics 
Smartphone Malware Propagation
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3. Smartphone Malware Statistics 
Additional Information
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Android: Next Target?
 Android
 Main parts are set open source
 Malware for Android
 bypass permission system
 Linux for malicious payload
 Can reboot a „rooted“ device
 „Loop of death“ through daemon
 Additionally: always keep an
an eye on Collin Mulliner’s work
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4. Countermeasures - AV
 Antivirus software
 Startet with simple pattern matching
 16 Byte were enough
 Was extended by Wildcard approach
 Was extended by Mismatch approach
 Smartphone antivirus limited to 
signature-based approaches
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4. Countermeasures – AV 
Improvements: 1st Gen.
 Hashing
 Increase speed of comparison
 Generic detection 
 (in most cases simple single string detecting variants)
 Bookmarks
 Distance start of virus body to matching string
 Top and Tail Scanning
 Scan first or last bytes ->early viruses mod. these areas
 Entry-point and Fixed-point scanning
 Start scanning in seperate areas
 Hyperfast scanning
 Access hd via bios bypassing OS-level API
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4. Countermeasures – AV 
Improvements: 2nd Gen.
 Smart Scanning
 Ignores nop
 Skeleton Scanning
 Checks makros line by line for ignoring 
useless instructions
 Nearly exact identification
 Two strings to match instead of one
 Exact identification
 As many as necessary (static) ranges
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4. Countermeasures – AV 
Improvements: Further 1/2
 Algorithmic Scanning
 If standard alg. fails, propietary algorithm is 
used
 Formery were hard-coded detection routines
 Filtering
 Static decryptor detection
 Cryptographic detection
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4. Countermeasures – AV 
Improvements: Further 2/2
 Code Emulation
 Geometric Detection
 Checks for alteration in file system
 Heuristic Analysis
 Basically – behavior-based
 Disassembling
 Heuristic Analysis using Neural Networks
 Basically applied AI, feature-based
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4. Countermeasures – Anomaly 
Detection
X
Y
True-positive
False-positives
True-positive
False-negative
True-negatives
Data is collected and mapped
to internal representation
Cluster / Bound ries are setNew benign data is collect d
and mapped (t ue- egative)
M licious ac ivi y monitored
(true-positive)
Malware now detected, but new 
benign software falsely detected
as malware (false-positive)
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4. Countermeasures – Static 
Function Call Analysis 1/2
 Current solutions use signatures
 Vulnerable to new/unknown malware
 Vulnerable to old malware
 Function call analysis can be valuable 
extension
 Check similarity to benign applications
 Light-weight algorithms
 High detection rates
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4. Countermeasures – Static 
Function Call Analysis 2/2
1. Function calls are extracted 
 From common benign software
 From installed application
2. Function calls are compared
 Simple string matching for occurrences
3. Occurences are checked for
 Clusters
 Statistics
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5. Conclusion
 Smartphone malware evolution
 Main target Symbian
 New platforms still waiting for malware „in the 
wild“
 Countermeasures on smartphones currently 
limited to signature-based approaches
 Our research shows that static analysis might be 
an interesting addition
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